Searching that HMG Russia report - over-bloat to obfuscate

I read that HMG Russia Response report and noticed the language it used was all 'going forward' language and 'we wills'. Considering it was a chance to deep-dive into the manipulation of democracy by a Foreign state, there seemed to be little to say about any of it.

I was going to half-heartedly type in 'click-farms' to my search through the document but decided instead to go for 'click'. Nil results.

I did a double-take but then thought I'd try 'Facebook'. Again nil results.

I worried that my Search option wasn't working so I typed in 'Russia'. Yes, my search still worked, I got 20 pages this time.

What about 'advertising'? Maybe best to shorten to 'advert'? Two results (and a spurious 'inadvertently').

I decided that the 100-word headlines to the paragraphs were too long and had been written in consultant-speak. So here's their some of their conclusions, pasted directly from their own words with my simplified headlines (i.e. my headings, their words).

INEPT OVERCOMPLICATION PREVENTS DEFENCE FROM HOSTILES
"This focus has led us to question who is responsible for broader work against the Russian threat and whether those organisations are sufficiently empowered to tackle a hostile state threat such as Russia. In some instances, we have therefore recommended a shift in responsibilities. In other cases we have recommended a simplification: there are a number of unnecessarily complicated wiring diagrams that do not provide the clear lines of accountability that are needed."

TEFLON COATED LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY
"Accountability is an issue in particular – whilst the Foreign Secretary has responsibility for the NCSC, which is responsible for incident response, the Home Secretary leads on the response to major cyber incidents. Indeed, there are a number of other Ministers with some form of responsibility for Cyber – the Defence Secretary has overall responsibility for Offensive Cyber as a ‘warfighting tool’ and for the National Offensive Cyber Programme, while the Secretary of State for the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) leads on digital matters, with the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster being responsible for the National Cyber Security Strategy and the National Cyber Security Programme."

INHERENT INEFFICIENCIES
"...Reacting to the here and now is inherently inefficient and – in our opinion – until recently the Government had badly underestimated the Russian threat and the response it required.”

RUSSIAN MONEY SWAMPS THE SECURITY SERVICES
"We have previously discussed the extent to which economic policy dictated the opening of the UK to Russian investment. This indicates a failure of the security policy departments to engage with this issue – to the extent that the UK now faces a threat from Russia within its own borders. What appears to have been a somewhat laissez-faire policy approach is less easy to forgive than that of the busy Agencies. We welcome the fact that this has now been recognised and appears to be changing."

SLOW DECISION MAKING BY HMG
"It is not clear to the Committee whether HMG and our allies have yet found an effective way to respond to the pace of Russian decision-making. This has severely undermined the West’s ability to respond effectively to Russian aggressions in the past – for example, the annexation of Crimea in 2014."

NAIVE ACCEPTANCE OF DARK RUSSIAN FINANCE
"The UK welcomed Russian money, and few questions – if any – were asked, regarding the provenance of this considerable wealth. It appears that the UK Government at the time held the belief (more perhaps in hope than expectation) that developing links with major Russian companies would promote good governance by encouraging ethical and transparent practices, and the adoption of a law-based commercial environment."

CHARITY AND HOUSE OF LORDS USED AS A RUSSIAN MONEY FUNNEL
"Several members of the Russian elite who are closely linked to Putin are identified as being involved with charitable and/or political organisations in the UK, having donated to political parties, with a public profile which positions them to assist Russian influence operations. It is notable that a number of Members of the House of Lords have business interests linked to Russia, or work directly for major Russian companies linked to the Russian state – these relationships should be carefully scrutinised, given the potential for the Russian state to exploit them. It is important that the Code of Conduct for Members of the House of Lords, and the Registry of Lords’ interests, including financial interests, provide the necessary transparency and are enforced. In this respect we note that the Code of Conduct for Members of Parliament requires that MPs register individual payments of more than £100 which they receive for any employment outside the House – this does not apply to the House of Lords, and consideration should be given to introducing such a requirement.” (incidentally they are crystal-clear 43/47/31/53 word sentences)

RUSSIAN STANDING JOKE THAT LONDONGRAD CAN BE USED AS A MONEY LAUNDROMAT
"What is now clear is that it was, in fact, counter-productive, in that it offered ideal mechanisms by which illicit finance could be recycled through what has been referred to as the London ‘laundromat’. […] This level of integration – in ‘Londongrad’ in particular – means that any measures now being taken by the Government are not preventative, but rather constitute damage limitation."



ANOTHER 'BUSY' COMMITTEE - THE DEFENDING DEMOCRACY GROUP
"The Cabinet Office established the Defending Democracy programme to bring together our work to safeguard our democratic processes and to make sure that our democracy remains safe and inclusive, now and into the future. The Programme ... brings together capabilities and expertise from Government departments, the Security and Intelligence Agencies and civil society to ensure UK democracy remains open and vibrant as well as secure. The programme has four priorities:
* Protect and secure UK democratic processes, systems and institutions from interference, including from cyber, personnel and physical threats.
* Strengthen the integrity of UK elections.
* Encourage Respect for open, fair and safe democratic participation.
* Promote fact-based and open discourse, including online."

OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT NOT FIT FOR PURPOSE
"We recognise the need to get legislation right. Nevertheless, it is very clear that the Official Secrets Act regime is not fit for purpose and the longer this goes unrectified, the longer the security and intelligence community’s hands are tied. It is essential that there is a clear commitment to bring forward new legislation to replace it (and a timetable within which it will be introduced) that can be used by MI5 to defend the UK against agents of a hostile foreign power such as Russia."


THE COMPUTER MISUSE ACT SHOULD BE UPDATED TO REFLECT MODERN USE OF PERSONAL ELECTRONIC DEVICES
(No further paragraphs on this one)

There were few other items, mainly covering working together with other countries. I've left them out because now we have been cut loose from the EU and Interpol some of them may no longer apply.

I thought I'd use the space to list a few of Boris's alleged Russian Chums instead. Let's not forget whose party he went to the night after his election win.


BORIS CHUMS?

List of alleged @BorisJohnson Russian oligarch friends- some made whilst creating Londongrad.

* Alexander Temerko (led 2016 Leader campaign)
* Evgeny Lebedev (Bunga Parties in Italy)
* Alexander Lebedev (ex-KGB, Secret mtg)
* Roman Abramovich (2016)
* Dasha Zhukova (private mtg 2012)
* Lubov Chernukin (£160,000 tennis match)
* Ambassador Yakovenko (2013 City Hall mtg)
* FSB Spy Sergei Nalobin (2010-15)
* Russia Spy Joseph Mifsud (2017 mtg)
* Robert Hanson/Masha Markova (2009 mtg)
* Andrei Borodin
* Pitroyr Birynkov
* Mayor Sobyanin
* Yuri Luzhkov (2008- came to UK)
* Yelena Baturina (City Hall)

https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1199326561297674243.html

Here's Boris after one of the parties with everything in the balance.